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Abstract 
The human rights arguments that underpinned the fight against HIV over the last three decades were 
poised, but ultimately failed, to provide a similar foundation for success against multidrug-resistant 
TB (MDR-TB) and other diseases of the poor. With more than 1.5 million deaths since 2000 attributed 
to strains of MDR-TB, and with half a million new, and mostly untreated, MDR-TB cases in the world 
each year, the stakes could not be higher. The World Health Organization (WHO), whose mandate 
is to champion the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health, recommended 
unsound medical treatment for MDR-TB patients in resource-poor settings from 1993-2002. Citing cost 
considerations, WHO did not recommend the available standard of care that had been successfully used to 
contain and defeat MDR-TB in rich countries. By acting as a strategic gatekeeper in its technical advisory 
role to donor agencies and countries, it also facilitated the global implementation of a double standard 
for TB care in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), upending important legal and scientific 
priorities. This raises serious questions about whether the organization violated international human 
rights standards and those established in its own constitution. While calling for additional analysis and 
discussion on this topic, the authors propose that policymakers should reject double standards of this 
kind and instead embrace the challenge of implementing the highest standard of care on a global level. 
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Introduction
Between the late 1990s and the present, human 
rights activists successfully institutionalized the 
principle that the highest standard of clinical care 
for HIV is a public good. Although much remains 
to be accomplished in the treatment and prevention 
of HIV, this moral and pragmatic orientation en-
abled more than 15 million individuals out of an 
estimated 36.9 million people living with HIV to 
access antiretroviral therapy in 2015. AIDS-related 
deaths dropped by 42% between 2004 and 2014; 
new HIV infections in adults fell by 35% after 2000 
and by 58% in children.1 
Gains against HIV have not been replicated 
against TB, despite the fact that it remains the 
biggest killer of people living with HIV and is now 
the top infectious killer of adults in the world.2 
This airborne bacterial disease has been treatable 
and preventable since the 1950s, yet kills 1.5 million 
annually—4,000 people each day.2 Although an 
estimated 9 million people are thought to become 
sick with TB each year, only 6 million are diagnosed 
and given some form of treatment. Of the 1 million 
children sickened by TB each year, a very small 
fraction receives care.3 Rates of TB have dropped a 
mere 1.65% per year despite a two-decade interna-
tional effort led by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) to control the disease.4 
Despite the reduction in deaths from TB since 
1990, a worrisome aspect of the disease remains 
largely unaddressed in practice: drug resistance.5 
Between 2000 and 2009, an estimated 5 million 
people were infected with multidrug-resistant TB 
(MDR-TB): strains of Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
resistant to isoniazid and rifampin, the backbone 
of first-line anti-TB therapy. Of these, an estimat-
ed 1.5 million died.6 According to WHO, 190,000 
people died of MDR-TB and an estimated 480,000 
cases occurred in 2014 alone; of these, only 123,000 
were detected and reported; even fewer received ap-
propriate treatment; and only half of those treated 
were cured.7 Almost 10% of these individuals were 
infected with extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-
TB), difficult-to-cure strains of TB resistant not 
only to isoniazid and rifampin but also the drugs 
that form the backbone of the second-line anti-TB 
regimen (fluoroquinolones and parenteral agents).8 
Without treatment, most people sick with any form 
of TB will infect people in their families and com-
munities, and will eventually die from the disease. 
Despite the dangers of this airborne killer, for 
most of the 1990s, international donors, non-profit 
organizations, and national governments were ad-
vised by WHO not to treat patients infected with 
MDR-TB, but rather to focus on preventing the 
emergence of drug resistance.9 There were rational-
izations for this policy: weak health systems in poor 
countries; lack of capacity to implement complex 
health interventions; even scientifically disproven 
ideas that drug-resistant strains would not be as 
transmissible. However, the driving force was a 
concern over cost.10 These MDR-TB policies from 
WHO were emblematic of a long-standing conflict 
between principles of cost-effectiveness and sound 
epidemic control strategies for TB in low- and mid-
dle-income countries (LMICs).11 
The juxtaposition of arguments for equal 
treatment of those sick with epidemic HIV against 
the simultaneous failure of those arguments for 
global solidarity in relation to epidemic MDR-TB 
highlights significant gaps in human rights-based 
decision-making in global health. As rates of MDR-
TB shot up in the 1990s, policymakers were able 
to shroud substandard care in a discourse of cost 
that overrode the best available clinical judgment 
for a decade. The scientific standards of care which 
would otherwise have been appropriate to treat 
MDR-TB were thus systematically excluded in re-
source-poor settings. 
In this article, we discuss how a series of MDR-
TB diagnostic and treatment policies—driven 
primarily by economistic considerations and prop-
agated by WHO from 1993 to 2002 may have led 
to hundreds of thousands of avoidable deaths, and 
set the stage for increased transmission of drug- 
resistant strains. In endorsing double standards, 
excusing—and even mandating—failing to care 
for the sick living in low-resource settings, this ap-
proach simultaneously violated bedrock principles 
of scientific medicine and of human rights law. Our 
purpose is to advocate for accountability, oriented 
towards prospective policy transformation rather 
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than retrospective legal liability.12 Where contem-
porary decisions in favor of double standards are 
driven by similar cost considerations, we hope our 
analysis will give policymakers due cause to reject 
this approach.13
Multidrug-resistant TB and short-course 
chemotherapy
Rifampin, an oral medication, is one of the most 
potent anti-TB drugs found in the 70 years since 
antibiotics first came into use.14 Before rifampin 
was introduced in the 1960s, the full course of 
treatment for TB took a year or more, often involv-
ing daily injections and hospitalization.15 Rifampin 
made it possible to cure TB in six to nine months. 
In wealthy countries, it became the cornerstone 
of short-course chemotherapy (SCC). Elsewhere, 
rifampin’s cost was considered prohibitive until 
years after the US patent expired in 1987. Before 
then, many public health experts advocated more 
toxic, less effective drugs for use in poor countries.16
It was eventually shown that a multidrug SCC 
regimen based on isoniazid and rifampin, supple-
mented with pyrazinamide and ethambutol, cured 
almost all patients who adhered to treatment—un-
less they were infected with a rifampin-resistant 
strain of TB.17 This regimen was soon regarded as 
the gold standard of empirical first-line care.18 Other 
studies had already demonstrated that home-based 
treatment was safe and highly effective when appro-
priately supervised.19 The reduced cost of drugs and 
clinicians for outpatient SCC made it attractive in 
settings with limited resources and infrastructure. 
Yet the well-known ability of disease-caus-
ing microorganisms to develop resistance during 
chemotherapy remained a challenge.20 It was soon 
established that monotherapy allows some M. tu-
berculosis organisms to evolve into drug-resistant 
forms, and anti-TB medications had to be taken 
in combination.21 Still, some people undergoing 
therapy were either not cured or suffered a relapse 
post-cure, often indicating that the infecting strain 
of TB was resistant to one or more of the medicines 
from the beginning—primary drug resistance—or 
that it developed resistance during treatment. Care 
providers turned to second-line anti-TB drugs, 
many of which cause a variety of treatable adverse 
events. Drug-resistant strains—which, like all 
forms of TB, are transmitted in families, commu-
nities, health facilities, and places of work, when 
appropriate treatment is not provided—require up 
to two years of treatment.22
In the late 1980s, outbreaks of MDR-TB were 
reported all over the US, most notably in New York 
City. Deploying clinical knowledge from national 
reference centers, the US dealt with the epidemic 
decisively. The treatment strategy, pioneered in the 
1950s and 60s, included active case-finding, diag-
nosis using mycobacterial cell culture and drug 
sensitivity testing, second-line drugs, infection 
control, and delivery of care under direct obser-
vation and with patient supports. Health officials 
reined in the epidemic. Such comprehensive public 
health strategies, along with the use of second-line 
drugs, became the standard of care.23 As noted in 
one report from New York City in the early 1990s, 
clinicians found it “easy to prevent transmission 
by ensuring that patients with recently acquired 
disease are treated promptly, appropriately, and 
completely—ideally, with directly observed therapy 
(DOT).”24
The US outbreaks of MDR-TB foreshadowed 
a global problem. DR-TB was observed around 
the world, making it clear that SCC alone would 
not suffice.25 An “amplifier effect” of improperly 
applied SCC—where resistance to most drugs in 
a treatment cocktail allowed for the evolution of 
resistance to the other drugs in the cocktail—had 
been proposed in the mid-1980s.26 In 1995, the NGO 
Partners In Health (PIH) encountered an outbreak 
of MDR-TB in a slum area of Lima, Peru, and pub-
lished evidence that that seemed to suggest such 
“amplification.”27 
The Peruvian National Tuberculosis Program 
maintained a close working relationship with the 
WHO Global Tuberculosis Program, receiving 
extensive technical support from Geneva, and 
providing operational feedback for WHO recom-
mendations.28 In 1995, Peru revised its guideline 
regimens under WHO supervision to include a 
standardized eight-month retreatment regimen 
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which added the antibiotic streptomycin to the 
default regimen of four first-line drugs (isoniazid, 
rifampin, pyrazinamide, and ethambutol); the 
following year, WHO named Peru a “model DOTS 
program.”29 Yet retrospective analysis of laboratory 
samples makes clear that by adding a single drug 
to failing regimens, the retreatment protocol was 
promoting further resistance.30
In 1997, WHO published global guidelines 
for the treatment of DR-TB, advising countries to 
divide patients into ranked priority categories.31 The 
first category regarded new cases presumed to be 
infected with drug-susceptible TB strains. The next 
category included retreatment cases for whom six 
months of SCC had already proven unsuccessful; as 
in Peru, they were to receive the four drugs of SCC 
plus streptomycin. The third category included 
patients with extra-pulmonary TB or those whose 
sputum otherwise tested negative for TB. The last 
category included “chronic” patients who had failed 
the retreatment regimen.32 
As these guidelines were being drawn up, the 
WHO Global Tuberculosis Program recommended 
a course of action to the Peruvian Ministry of Health 
following these categories, including a standard-
ized retreatment regimen for so-called crónicos, 
the cost of which was less than one-fifth that of 
the regimen for MDR-TB patients being suggested 
to European countries.33 Instead of turning to the 
successful approach from New York City and else-
where, Peru was advised to implement an untested 
standardized therapy.34 Although this involved 18 
months of treatment with second-line drugs (at 
sub-therapeutic doses), it still included ethambutol 
and pyrazinamide. Because it did not involve drug 
sensitivity testing, a hallmark of the strategy used 
in New York, patients received second-line drugs to 
which they were already resistant. Unsurprisingly, 
the outcomes of this approach were poor: only 
48% achieved cure and a significant number died.35 
Many acquired further drug resistance.36 
Echoing arguments of HIV activists, PIH 
rejected this double standard of care that triaged 
patients by their location in the global economy. 
Using outside resources, the organization demon-
strated that the approach used to stem the New York 
epidemic—modified for community-based care in 
Lima’s slums—could achieve higher cure rates (83% 
probable cure for patients who received at least four 
months of treatment, and 66.3% validated cure for 
all enrolled MDR patients) and prevent death.37 
DOTS and the political economy of MDR-TB
On what was WHO advice to Peru based? A 1993 ad-
dress by then-Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima 
gives some insight. Speaking to the World Health 
Assembly, Nakajima spoke of increasingly strong 
“working relationships with the World Bank (WB) 
and regional development banks,” adding that the 
agency “has been closely associated with the WB in 
preparing its 1993 report Investing in Health.”38 
Three years later, armed with the published 
outcomes of TB treatment with the WB-funded 
medicines, Nakajima proclaimed “a new approach 
to improve compliance with treatment of TB 
(DOTS), first tested in Africa and China,” which 
he asserted were “successfully applied later in New 
York to overcome episodes of drug resistance.”39 
The DOTS brand name (as it was called in subse-
quent WHO publications) was a portmanteau of 
DOT and SCC.40 
Despite claims in the press, DOTS was mostly 
touted for its low cost rather than scientific rigor.41 
While health officials in New York used DOT to 
monitor adverse events and increase treatment 
compliance, they did not rely on SCC to stop the 
spread of MDR-TB. The international response to 
the MDR-TB epidemic, however, focused on cost. 
Nakajima argued that treatment for a single patient 
in developed countries was “up to US$250,000,” 
which assumed two years of continuous hos-
pitalization and was explicitly contradicted by 
government sources.42 A year after this claim, a 
cost analysis based on US data produced a figure 
of US$6,000-$8,000, assuming precisely the am-
bulatory treatment model adopted by PIH in Peru 
two years later.43 Meanwhile, the inflated figure of 
US$250,000 was used to imply that if DOTS and 
SCC were supplemented by the longer regimens 
that could cure MDR-TB patients, the cost-effec-
tiveness of TB treatment, touted by both WHO and 
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the WB, would be undermined.44
WHO’s alliance with donors, including the 
WB, made it difficult for countries to reject WHO 
advice without putting national TB programs in 
financial jeopardy. For example, in approving loan 
funding for TB control, the WB relied on WHO 
as a gatekeeper in two key areas: (1) standardized 
global treatment protocols that were compared for 
conformity to country-level documents and prac-
tices; (2) the Model List of Essential Drugs (EDL) 
which, after its inception in 1977, formed the basis 
for standard formularies of international procure-
ment agencies accepted by WB country-level staff 
in project planning.45 Not only did most health 
ministries rely on WHO’s EDL to compile their 
own formularies, they were often limited by law to 
these essential drugs in procurement for WB-fund-
ed projects.46 
Even when WHO literature acknowledged 
that second-line drugs were the only way to treat 
MDR-TB, the contradiction with DOTS and the 
EDL on which it was based was resolved by an even 
more explicitly discriminatory and economistic 
rationale. For example, guidelines issued in 1997 by 
the Southeast Asian WHO Regional Office stated 
only second-line drugs could be effective against 
MDR-TB. However, the authors continued: “In 
many high-TB-prevalence countries, second-line 
drugs are prohibitively expensive and unavailable,” 
and thus: “Multi-drug resistant TB is… often un-
treatable.”47 It was not that patients with MDR-TB 
in poor countries were not being treated, or that a 
choice should be made not to treat them, but rather 
that, due to costs, they could not be treated at all.
Even toward the end of the 1993-2002 pe-
riod, this approach was pervasive. It informed 
the 2002-2003 editions of the EDL which include 
comparative cost-effectiveness, rather than simply 
effectiveness, as a criterion for inclusion of a drug, 
despite the fact that the stated purpose of the list 
is to make effective drugs more affordable.48 This 
circular approach prohibits, on the basis of cost, the 
inclusion of certain drugs whose pricing could be 
reduced through negotiation with manufacturers 
or other market mechanisms (for example, through 
an advance-purchase option or bulk purchases). 
It also shifts the focus away from clinical needs 
to an economistic rationalization of double stan-
dards based on one’s place in the global economy. 
This discrimination was and is compounded on a 
national level by the economic and political mar-
ginalization experienced by TB patients in general.
WHO Director-General Nakajima stated that 
because of the high expense (again: “up to US$ 250,000 
per case”), the conditions of treatment for MDR-TB 
“can be met only in the industrialized countries and 
in sophisticated hospital settings,” concluding that 
“for those who develop the disease in the developing 
world MDR is a virtual death sentence.”49 This pes-
simism was self-fulfilling. First, it was contradicted 
by price reductions in rifampin that had made the 
DOTS strategy itself possible. Second, it legitimated 
a crude application of cost-effectiveness criteria that 
neglected long-term epidemiological and fiscal im-
pact. The pessimism also proved unrealistic. After 
a multi-national group of stakeholders convened 
to form a Green Light Committee for MDR-TB 
treatment—exchanging stringent programmatic 
oversight for lower drug prices from manufacturers 
concerned about the misuse of second-line anti-TB 
drugs—many programs successfully treated MDR-
TB in resource-limited settings.50  Countries like 
Russia and Turkey, with some capacity to support TB 
treatment without donor financing, refused initially 
during this period to adopt DOTS protocols.51 The 
Russian national program head went so far as to call 
it “soup-kitchen medicine,” but ultimately did accept 
DOTS protocols during the post-Soviet period.52 
For many countries, the MDR-TB epidemic 
worsened from 1995 to 2005.53 For example, six years 
after Belarus adopted DOTS-based WHO treatment 
protocols almost identical to the ones rejected in the 
1990s by PIH and others (including the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), nearly 
half of diagnosed TB patients had either MDR- or 
XDR-TB.54 WHO’s persistence in choosing to recom-
mend sub-standard treatment regimens due to cost 
for treatment of DR-TB in these countries clearly had 
deadly stakes. In the circumstances, were human 
rights standards violated? 
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Violation of WHO’s Constitution and 
ICESCR standards
We proceed along two broad lines of policy-directed 
legal argument: one concerned with cost consider-
ations and sound medical care; the other with the 
predictable elusiveness of equality—touchstone of 
a human rights regime—for vulnerable people. As 
to the first line: perhaps the most decisive factual 
consideration is the biomedical one. The standard 
of care, to which so many patients were subjected, 
did not actually meet the biomedical threshold for 
care. Re-treating TB patients with first-line drugs 
after they failed to respond, without any attempt to 
determine their sensitivity to those drugs, is not, 
properly speaking, providing patients with care. 
It is even less so when low-income countries are 
guided to ignore patients infected with MDR–TB. 
WHO has a distinctive constitutional burden and 
policy imperative to uphold the international hu-
man rights regime that drives towards the highest 
standard of health for everyone without allowing 
socioeconomic realities to invert medically sound 
care. Although a high-stakes debate exists among 
commentators about the legal acceptability of 
different standards of medical care for proven ther-
apies—where some maintain that standards may 
vary according to state resource level—few would 
embrace WHO’s brand of cost-effective non-care 
as justified. As to the second line: we need to un-
derstand that WHO’s treatment protocol harmed 
the most vulnerable of TB patients with legally 
protected interests. The reason to recognize this 
harm—and its unacceptability within the human 
rights regime—is to help foster transformative ac-
countability, moving away from double standards.55
Our policy-oriented legal analysis follows. At 
the threshold, we account for the relevance to the 
actors of the sources of law. Next, we identify rele-
vant legal standards from WHO’s Constitution and 
the International Covenant on ESCR (ICESCR). Fi-
nally, we discuss those standards in light of our two 
broad lines of policy concern, taking into account 
anticipatable legal counter-argument. 
Thresholds
WHO’s Constitution is binding on WHO. ICESCR 
directly binds States parties, and a push is under-
way for international organizations like WHO to 
acknowledge a measure of responsibility or account-
ability to the standards of the ICESCR as well.56 
WHO is a creature of its constituent act. As 
“has often been emphasized, [these acts] have 
a dual character: contractual (since the vast 
majority…are international treaties), as well as 
constitutional (since they represent the backbone of 
the organization’s legal order).”57 We invoke WHO’s 
Constitution because of the constitutional (rather 
than international) character of its internal rules, 
which directly bind the organization. The Con-
stitution leads with many preambular purposes, 
a sole objective, and a list of functions to achieve 
its objective.58 Article 75 explains “any question 
or dispute concerning the interpretation of ap-
plication of this Constitution”—that is, any legal 
question about the constitutional sufficiency of the 
organization’s actions—will be settled by the World 
Health Assembly (WHA), the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), or another mechanism agreed upon 
by States parties and WHO.59 
Our purpose is not adjudicatory. Instead we 
draw attention to the legal standards upon which 
WHO is founded as organizational policy bench-
marks to be kept front and center at the point of 
policy choice. A constitution that champions the 
rights of “all peoples” and “every human being” 
creates a legitimate expectation on the part of these 
people, including the millions around the world 
who are suffering from TB, that WHO policies will 
hew to constitutional commitments.60 
WHO should have no quarrel with our ac-
count of their constitutional obligations and their 
significance to its policymaking. Its publicly posted 
Fact Sheet 323 opens with “Key fact[]: The WHO 
Constitution enshrines ‘…the highest attainable 
standard of health as a fundamental right of every 
human being.’” “Health policies and programmes,” 
it recognizes, “have the ability to either promote 
or violate human rights, including the right to 
health, depending on the way they are designed 
or implemented.”61 In this and other publications, 
WHO reinforces the principle that its Constitution 
bears directly on its policy decisions, encouraging 
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our claim that the public has legitimate legally 
grounded expectations for the conduct of WHO 
and its policymaking partners.62 The expectation is 
that enshrined constitutional standards will also be 
embedded in the content of WHO protocols. Along 
with others, we attach a policy imperative to its 
legal scaffolding: “The WHO has the constitutional 
responsibility to lead the way in developing the 
[global health] roadmap—and mobilizing coun-
tries to follow.”63 
ICESCR directly binds state parties.64 Some 
164 countries are parties, including many of the 
countries (Belarus, India, Peru) where the WHO 
protocol was deployed. But what of WHO? Here 
the legal line of obligation is much less clear than 
in the case of its Constitution. Several commenta-
tors have argued that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the WB “are governed by human 
rights instruments” and “have obligations con-
cerning the international law of human rights.”65 A 
central element of the legal argument against such 
an interpretation has been that it would require an 
international organization like the IMF to “disre-
gard its own legal structure for the sake of pursuing 
goals that are not its mandated purposes.”66 To 
the contrary, WHO’s Constitution “explicitly… 
include[s] the promotion of human rights.”67 It 
also fundamentally laid the normative founda-
tion for the ICESCR’s right to health.68 While not 
unanimous, “it appears … widely accepted that, in 
principle, international organizations are bound by 
customary international law” (CIL)69 and “general 
rules of international law”70 and that these sources 
of obligation contribute to General Comment No. 
14 (GC14) attaching both “obligation” and “respon-
sibility” to WHO.71  GC14 explains: “While only 
States are parties to the Covenant…, all members 
of society—[including] intergovernmental …or-
ganizations…—have responsibilities regarding the 
realization of the right to health.”72 
As a matter of policy, there seems little 
question that WHO has reason to operate in con-
formance with international human rights law. In 
2003, it adopted the UN Statement of Common 
Understanding. The aim was to provide a “coherent 
definition on the Human-Rights-Based Approach 
…and operational guidance in applying a HRBA 
in their work.”73 Indeed, as the leading institution 
for the human rights-based health regime, WHO 
would lose significant institutional legitimacy if it 
denies the relevance of that law for its policy.
Standards
We turn to the standards against which this episode 
in WHO history may be assessed, and more impor-
tantly, reassessed for the future. On their face, these 
standards are concerned with the substantive com-
ponents of population-level right of health for all 
and the relevance of socioeconomic considerations 
of resources in relationship to that right.74 
Substantive standards constituting the right to 
health for everyone
Sweepingly, WHO’s Constitution preamble ex-
plains “Health is a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being,” and “the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of health 
is one of the fundamental rights of every human 
being without distinction of race, religion, political 
belief, economic or social condition.”75 “[A]ll peo-
ples,” should be extended “the benefits of medical, 
psychological, and related knowledge…essential 
to the fullest attainment of health.” Article 1 an-
nounces the sole objective of WHO “shall be the 
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health.”76 The ICESCR reinforces the big 
vision: recognizing “the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health;” (Article 12(1)) pledging 
parties to take steps to “achieve the full realization 
of this right;” (Article 12(2)) explicitly focusing on 
measures necessary for “prevention, treatment and 
control of epidemic, endemic…diseases.” (Article 
12(2)(c)) The rights attach to everyone (Article 12(1)) 
and all peoples (Preamble/WHO). And “complete 
wellbeing” (Preamble/WHO) is grounded in what 
is “possible” (Article 1/WHO) and “attainable” (Ar-
ticle 12/ICESCR) in the world we live in.77 
According to GC14, “the right to health must 
be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a va-
riety of facilities, goods, services and conditions 
necessary for the realization of the highest attain-
T. Nicholson, C. Admay, A. Shakow, and S. Keshavjee  / TB and the Right to Health, 85-102
92
J U N E  2 0 1 6    V O L U M E  1 8    N U M B E R  1   Health and Human Rights Journal
able standard of health.”78 In a formulaic framework 
it sets out essential elements of the right, minimum 
core obligations, and priority obligations.79 It 
anticipates that securing whole population-level 
health—a right of everyone—will encounter “for-
midable structural…obstacles.”80 Accordingly, 
it calls for sustained attention to equality (and 
non-discrimination) and to those it is easy to pre-
dict might not be attended to at all: the “vulnerable 
and marginalized.”81 We will return to this concern 
in our discussion. Beforehand, we set out one more 
category of standards: those that are to guide states 
and WHO as they negotiate the realities of their 
places in the global economy. 
Standards structuring the legal relevance of 
socioeconomic realities
Neither WHO’s Constitution, nor the ICESCR, is 
blind to the fact that substantive goals for global 
health are to be fielded by actors with varied levels 
of resources and power. When WHO’s Constitution 
calls for the highest attainable standard of health, it 
notes that this standard must be maintained “with-
out distinction…of economic or social condition.” 
The ICESCR, too, does not dilute its highest stan-
dard. It is still the case that everyone is to enjoy the 
highest attainable standard of health, but a measure 
of realism is necessary as to timing and solidarity. 
The entire Covenant is modified by what is known 
as the progressive realization clause. It reads:
2.1 Each State Party… undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and techni-
cal, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized…by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.82 
GC14 explains this clause gives duty bearers a due 
amount of time to operationalize the range of social 
and economic rights. Anticipating costs, it creates 
an explicit obligation of solidarity among States 
parties and “other actors in a position to assist,” like 
WHO, to help low-income states more quickly and 
fully implement the gold-standard right to health.83 
Even though this nod to reality could be misread as 
a license to move slowly if at all, authoritative com-
mentators, including CESCR, argue such a reading 
violates the clause.84 “The progressive realization of 
the right to health over a period of time should not 
be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligations 
of all meaningful content.”85 “A strong presumption” 
attaches: “retrogressive measures taken in relation to 
the right to health are not permissible.”86 The point is 
to achieve full realization of health for all the people 
of the world. 
These instruments reveal that reality-conscious 
law is not static: it does not validate our being stuck 
in the very conditions that the law is seeking to 
change. Instead it contemplates a series of dynamic 
processes, engaged with by many actors, to see to it 
that the highest attainable standard is made real over 
time.87 Even if states bear the first responsibility to 
provide for their people, they are not alone. The du-
ties of progressive realization fall on many shoulders, 
including WHO, which must mutually “contribute 
to the effective progressive implementation of the…
Covenant.”88 On its face, this progressive realization 
clause imposes direct legal obligations on parties to 
adopt legislation, provide economic and technical 
assistance, take steps, and use all appropriate means. 
Structurally, the combination of these two health 
standards—the highest attainable clauses of WHO’s 
Constitution and the ICESCR, which set forth the 
content of the right to health, and the progressive 
realization clause, which takes account of disparate 
socioeconomic realities—form a strong legal frame-
work of mutual responsibility.89 
We turn now to a discussion of the two broad 
lines of policy-directed legal argument; first, with 
how cost considerations, sound medical care, and 
the human rights regime interact; second, with 
how visions of the highest standards for everyone 
prove predictably elusive, especially for the most 
vulnerable and marginalized. 
Discussion: Costs and standards
We argue WHO’s conduct in this period fell far 
short of its legal obligations. While championing 
the cost-sensitivity of its standard protocol for 
low-resource settings, it was insufficiently sensitive 
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to the protocol’s fundamental biomedical adequacy 
for large groups of patients. TB patients in the sec-
ond priority category tumbled to the bottom of the 
priority list, dismissed as crónicos, when they could 
have been treated with second-line drugs shown to 
be effective for many other patients. Far from an am-
bitious program to stop TB using the drugs known 
to combat the disease and improve patient health, 
the protocol arguably set up millions to miss the 
boat of effective treatment. Ineffective treatment in 
a context of high risk for MDR-TB not only kills TB 
sufferers but amplifies TB incidence, killing many 
more. This is not “soup- kitchen medicine.”90 The 
critical failing here is that WHO knew, or should 
have known, at some point earlier than when the 
protocol was no longer pursued, that it was medi-
cally unsound. Medically and economically, it is a 
category error to call systematic non-medical care 
cost-effective. It is ineffective and costly in human 
and economic terms. A regimen of such unsound 
medical mooring, in our view, violates WHO’s 
constitutional commitment to a highest attainable 
standard of health.
How might defenders of WHO’s protocol 
respond to the hard questions we’ve raised? We an-
ticipate a distinctively legal line of defense through 
the progressive realization clause of the ICESCR. To 
avoid confusion: this is the same clause that we and 
others have pointed to as providing a temporal ex-
tension and a mutually responsible vision of when 
and how—not whether—states can be expected to 
achieve gold-standard legal health rights.91 
But leading international lawyers of health 
and human rights interpret it differently. Meier and 
Mori state simply: “As a positive right, the right to 
health is resource-dependent.”92 They cite Fidler who 
maintains “the principle of progressive realization 
stands, therefore, for two propositions: (1) the ability 
of States to fulfill the right to health differs because 
their economic resources differ; and (2) the differ-
ent levels of economic development . . . mean that 
not all countries will enjoy an equivalent standard 
of health.”93 As far as it goes, we might understand 
these propositions as counsels of realism: even if 
more affluent states (and “other actors in a position 
to assist”) are obliged to help low-resource states 
meet obligations to fulfill the right to health, we can 
expect that it will be much harder for these states to 
translate the universal right in their own settings.94 
Fidler ultimately suggests a harder legal line: 
he writes “people …argue that the right to health 
cannot be a ‘universal human right.’ A person’s 
right to health is relative to his or her country’s 
level of economic development.”95 This is a very 
different legal proposition. In this version of a legal 
framework, the question is not when (in time) and 
how (in solidarity) will we collectively achieve a 
gold standard of the highest achievable standard 
of health (singular), but rather, how will some 200 
countries individually achieve multiple standards 
of health (plural) that are the highest for them giv-
en their place in the global economy. 
If this is the law, one can anticipate the argu-
ment that WHO’s DOTS strategy did the best that 
could be done for first-priority TB sufferers, but 
then lacked the resources to do much better for 
lower-priority sufferers. The second-line drugs were 
deemed to be so expensive that sufferers were “often 
untreatable.”96 Not because there was no treatment, 
but because the medically appropriate treatment 
was too expensive. In the face of lack of resources, 
goes the argument, it is legally fully contemplatable 
that there be one treatment protocol for people who 
will live or die on the basis of the protocol in Lima, 
and another for people who will live or die on the 
basis of it in New York City. 
Paradoxically, progressive realization—an 
explicitly dynamic principle aiming to achieve full 
realization for everyone—is invoked to legitimate 
the status quo.97 And yet, the clause itself makes 
clear that low-resource countries are entitled to 
depend on the solidarity of other states, and on 
other forms of “international assistance and co-
operation,” to make up the gap between what they 
can bring to the table and what their people need to 
achieve the gold standard of health. 
Such an interpretation also means that the 
notion of a human rights-based standard of health, 
indexed to what humans need for dignity and 
well-being, is transformed into a structure of plural 
standards, indexed to what national economies can 
support, not for humans, but for Americans, Rus-
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sians, Belarusians, Indians, or Peruvians.98 If we 
come to hold such a nationality-dependent under-
standing of Article 12’s health right, why does the 
clause refer to everyone’s right of enjoyment? Why 
does it refer to a single standard? Were this the aim, 
it would have been easy for the drafters of Article 12 
to refer to plural standards which nationals of party 
states could expect to enjoy. 
This is not to say that health initiatives should 
look the same in each community setting.99 But 
in situations like this, where the components of a 
successful, comprehensive program against MDR-
TB are known, the medical regimen used should 
be reasonably clinically effective for humans, not 
falsely cost-effective for Belarusians, Indians, or 
Peruvians. Put slightly differently, what matters is 
that care afforded to people with TB, in accordance 
with a legal right to “complete wellbeing and the 
highest attainable standard of … health,” must have 
a reasonable chance to be effective in addressing 
their disease. If second-line drugs are what it takes 
biologically to address TB, giving patients first-line 
drugs shown not to work for them is not a reason-
able standard of care. Even if it is possible to argue 
that, pending a stronger global responsibility legal 
regime, “soup-kitchen medicine” is contemplatable 
as a first step by the progressive realization clause, 
the law gives no license to faux medicine under 
cover of cost-effectiveness, as laid out by WHO.100 
Discussion: Vulnerability and standards
Returning to our second contention that WHO’s 
protocol unacceptably harmed among the most 
vulnerable of TB patients, we start with the clarity 
the ICESCR brings to prioritizing the health of TB 
sufferers. It specifically provides:
12.2 The steps to be taken by the States Parties… to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include 
those necessary for:…
 (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epi-
demic, endemic, …diseases;
It puts TB, in whatever socioeconomic setting it is 
found, on the treaty’s shortlist of what necessarily 
must be addressed as part of a population’s right 
to health.101 If the basic facts of TB—transmitted as 
it is through the air—aren’t enough to compel the 
application of gold-standard medical care, the law 
adds more reason for particularly attending to all 
who suffer from TB.
GC14’s framework is highly salient. Active 
case-finding, treatment of TB infection (so-called 
latent disease), treatment of children and other 
populations suffering disproportionately from 
non-respiratory TB, treatment of all TB forms (in-
cluding those requiring second-line medicines), 
appropriate diagnostics use including drug-sensitiv-
ity testing, infection control, appropriate delivery of 
care with required patient supports: all involve a mix 
of the lifeline of facilities, goods, and services. 
Moreover, these resources need to be avail-
able to TB sufferers, accessible, acceptable, and of 
“scientifically and medically appropriate” and good 
quality.102 The treatment protocol on which we 
have focused made the policy decision to withhold 
treatment from a large number of TB sufferers in 
low-resource settings. In the most basic sense, 
options, in principle, available to everyone located 
in New York City were not available to everyone 
in Lima. To be sure, GC14 notes the nature of ser-
vices, goods, and facilities available will vary from 
high- to low-resource setting. We can interpret this 
characterization as a static snapshot—taking real-
istic account of the variable resources available in 
the United States versus Peru—but not precluding 
the dynamic possibilities of building, in a highly 
cost-effective way, a much better matrix of available 
services, goods, and facilities.
And what of the accessibility prong of GC14’s 
framework? For many people with TB, gold-stan-
dard treatment is not accessible. WHO’s protocol 
collides with the non-discrimination requirement 
of accessibility, and the first and fifth obligation of 
the minimum core. GC14 explains that “facilities, 
goods and services have to be accessible to all, 
especially the most vulnerable or marginalized sec-
tions of the population, in law and in fact, without 
discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds…
[including]…property or health status which has 
the intention or the effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the equal enjoyment or exercise of the right to 
health.”103 Among the minimum core are the obli-
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gations “(a) to ensure the right of access to health 
facilities, goods and services, on a non-discrimina-
tory basis” and “(e) to ensure equitable distribution 
of all health facilities, goods and services.”104 
This strong stand taken by the ESCR Commit-
tee (and other authoritative interpreters) against 
inequality produced and reproduced by discrimi-
nation goes to the very core of our concern about 
double standards.105 The protocol deployed in Peru 
(and elsewhere) reveals two policy decisions. The 
first to treat TB sufferers in low- and high-resource 
settings under different protocols. The second to 
discriminate within the population of TB sufferers 
in low-resource settings so that some (those who 
were undiscoverable with poor DOTS-mandated 
diagnostic tools) and many others (those who 
failed initial treatment due to being given the 
wrong drugs for their strain of TB) effectively get 
no care. Our quarrel is not with the principle of 
triage: it is an operational feature of medicine and 
public health. Rather, we object to the inappropri-
ate, global use of this principle by policymakers for 
TB control. Instead of prioritizing those most in 
need, WHO treatment protocols advised national 
health authorities to restrict treatment to patients 
who could best demonstrate the cost-effectiveness 
of treatment with particular drugs and diagnostics, 
while ignoring patients that did not. 
Perversely, given the rhetoric of cost-savings, 
money was wasted on the ineffective retreatment 
regimens mandated by WHO recommendations 
for MDR-TB. Had those resources been spent on 
second-line medicines and comprehensive care, 
health outcomes would likely have been far better 
(again, 83% probable cure for MDR-TB patients 
who received at least four months of treatment, 
66.3% validated cure for all MDR-TB patients), in 
contrast to a global MDR-TB cure rate around 50% 
today).106 Since ineffective retreatment regimens 
also amplified the proportion of MDR-TB within 
national and regional populations, WHO rhetoric 
of cost-savings implied a further analytic error (on 
its own terms) of discounting future effectiveness 
in relation to present-day outcomes. 
More to the point of our analysis, such poli-
cies were discriminatory. In our Lima case, those 
people with TB health status who were poor, al-
ready the most vulnerable and marginalized in the 
population, were also the ones for whom access was 
structurally elusive. 
This brings us again to the affordability of 
second-line medicines. Our argument has been 
that WHO was quintessentially “an actor in a po-
sition to assist.”107 Had WHO’s committee making 
decisions about what drugs should be on the EDL 
included the second-line medicines, their cost 
may have come down much more quickly due to 
improved market conditions.108 Thus the cost pro-
file of any protocol is not a static fact to be used 
as a justification for discrimination. Instead what 
WHO does or does not do bears greatly on the 
dynamic process of needed medicines becoming 
affordable.109 Many LMICs follow WHO’s cue—ex-
pecting optimal guidance from it—and structure 
their own programs/procurement around WHO 
guidance. WHO judges what, medically and scien-
tifically, should be on that list; the WB helps states 
finance purchases from it. If states are failing this 
minimum-core obligation associated with their IC 
health undertakings, the failure is a shared one.110 
To be clear, in our mutual responsibility analysis, 
we do not argue that states are relieved of their 
obligations to contribute a maximum of available 
resources: only that they should not be understood 
as standing alone.
The mutuality of responsibility is delin-
eated in the CESCR’s account of the phrase 
“maximum available resources” in GC14111 and 
its more recent “Evaluation of the Obligation 
to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available 
Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant” (Evaluation). In the Evaluation, it 
explains: 
[t]he undertaking by a State party to use “the 
maximum” of its available resources towards fully 
realizing the provisions of the Covenant entitles it to 
receive resources offered by the international com-
munity. In this regard, the phrase “to the maximum 
of its available resources” refers to both the resources 
existing within a State as well as those available 
from the international community through inter-
national cooperation and assistance.112
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Here the committee suggests a direct relation-
ship between textual clauses of Article 2(1): 
“maximum available resources” and “interna-
tional assistance and cooperation.” The latter is 
a critical subpart of the former. 
WHO forms a vital part of this inter-
national community. Paragraph 45 of GC14 
makes clear that “actors in a position to assist” 
like WHO will bring their own distinctive 
forms of assistance as part of a strong legal 
framework of mutual responsibility. In our 
analysis we have emphasized the distinctive 
gatekeeping role the WHO has in relationship 
to the EDL (where clinically effective high-
priced medicines may be listed as the first step 
to bringing down the price) and its distinctive 
role in shaping the protocols, by which states 
will care for all patients amongst their popu-
lations (where WHO must take care not to put 
states—effectively required to follow WHO 
protocol in order to qualify for international 
assistance—into a position where it is high-
ly unlikely that they will be able to care for 
their most vulnerable people). So for example, 
as already noted, in a coordinated approach 
towards protection arguably contemplated by 
the ICESCR (Article 22) and GC14 (paragraphs 
63 and 64), states are more likely to be able to 
“provide essential drugs” (paragraph 43d) that 
might be expensive because WHO lists them. 
Also in a coordinated approach, states should 
not have to fight against the protocols in order 
to protect their most vulnerable people—and 
lose (as the Russians and Peruvians did). The 
CESCR Evaluation explains that in the CE-
SCR process for determining “alleged failure” 
by a state party in relationship to individual 
communications it will consider “[w]hether 
the steps [pursued by the state party] had taken 
into account the precarious situation of disad-
vantaged and marginalized individuals or groups 
and, whether they were nondiscriminatory, and 
whether they prioritized grave situations or situ-
ations of risk.”113 If we regard the Peru case as a 
failure, the failure arguably is more reasonably at-
tributed to the protocols recommended by WHO, 
than to the state relying—medically, and as a 
matter of political economy—on the protocols. 
GC14 is at particular pains to connect the 
drive for everyone’s enjoyment of the highest 
attainable health with concrete protections for 
those we must anticipate will be marginalized.114 
Frequently, the stipulation of gold-standard health 
for all is immediately followed by the specification, 
“especially for the most vulnerable or marginalized 
sections of the population.”115 Two of six mini-
mum-core obligations seek to secure “access…
especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups” 
and the adoption of a “national public health strat-
egy…addressing the health concerns of the whole 
population…[giving] particular attention to all 
vulnerable or marginalized groups.”116 The message 
is that equality is hard to build in a real world where, 
however equal people may be in dignity and worth, 
they are not equal in their ability to secure attention 
or care. Many are vulnerable, with a degree of risk 
appreciably different from everyone else, to dying. 
And so, the principles of non-discrimination and 
special protection for the most vulnerable take on 
decisive significance for people with TB and for our 
argument that medical regimens and legal interpre-
tations should not reproduce or reinforce the very 
realities they claim to be trying to change. As the 
Special Rapporteur has put it: “A State has a legal 
obligation to ensure that a health system is acces-
sible to all without discrimination, including those 
living in poverty…children, slum and rural dwell-
ers…The twin human rights principles of equality 
and non-discrimination mean that outreach (and 
other) programs must be in place to ensure that 
disadvantaged individuals and communities enjoy, 
in practice, the same access as those who are more 
advantaged.”117 In this we hear echoes of WHO’s 
Constitution, which states “the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of …economic or social condition.”118 
Double standards in treatment regimens or in the 
legal understanding of what rights a group of peo-
ple hold in relationship to life-saving (life-denying) 
treatments—on grounds of affordability—are fa-
cially incompatible with this law.
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We have concentrated on the legal standards of 
the Constitution and the ICESCR to help us evaluate 
a treatment strategy that was—and, in some places 
still is—WHO-mandated strategy.119 As noted, while 
WHO receives most of our attention, other global 
and national policymakers share in the mutual re-
sponsibility of forging a workable set of policies to 
implement these instruments. The point of deploy-
ing a legal analysis is to make certain legal principles 
more salient at the point of policy choice. What if 
WHO were to rely on its own medical moorings as 
well as its Constitution to reject double standards 
in low-resource settings? What if all actors in the 
global health space came to understand that there 
is strong legal reason to abandon a system of triage 
that compounds the vulnerability of the vulnerable 
while purporting to attend to it? These are the mixed 
law-and-policy questions we wish to raise. The status 
quo—in which high-minded principles enshrined in 
Constitutions and the like are violated in everyday 
operations—expresses a contradiction that must not 
easily persist. 
Conclusion: Human rights and global 
health
The global response to TB has been inadequate. With 
1.5 million people continuing to die from a treatable 
preventable disease every year, the response to the 
TB epidemic, and particularly MDR-TB, pales by 
any standard, both in intensity and outcome, next 
to the efforts to increase access to antiretroviral 
treatment for people living with HIV.
We have argued that international public health 
authorities prioritized cost considerations over 
clinical evidence when dealing with MDR-TB. The 
DOTS strategy provided a suboptimal path to treat-
ment for MDR-TB as well as for all forms of pediatric 
TB, people living with HIV, individuals unable to be 
diagnosed by the century-old low-sensitivity sputum 
smear test. In the process, WHO recommended to 
countries a scientifically unsound approach—and as 
technical advisor to donor agencies and countries, 
facilitated the implementation of a double standard 
in care. While this approach may be consistent with 
certain arguments regarding progressive realization 
of the highest attainable level of health across dis-
parate economies, we hold that such interpretations 
rely on an upended reading of the legal text and are 
not supported by data showing successes for HIV 
treatment in the same settings. 
Historically and today, a TB outbreak in afflu-
ent health systems is handled with urgency, using 
a comprehensive strategy based on sound epidem-
ic-control principles that prevent avoidable mortality 
and morbidity. This strategy includes patient support 
and diagnosis, active case-finding, and treatment for 
all forms of the disease. This same sound epidemic 
control strategy should be implemented, and en-
couraged, in poorer health systems. 
The arguments presented here may prove 
relevant to current and future guidelines for many 
other diseases. A critical part of the moral and 
pragmatic orientation required to move forward 
is the adoption of a more robust reading of the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
understanding the progressive realization language 
of human rights and health law to be working in 
tandem, and not against it. Recognition of this 
harmony may drive policymakers today and in the 
future to reject double standards in global health, 
and instead embrace the difficult work ahead, on a 
solid legal and scientific foundation. 
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